Event

Abstract: Why do some authoritarian regimes survive when they lack societal and international support and face a vivid opposition network? This paper studies transition to limited government as a bargaining process and focuses on regime contending groups’ capacity to propel democratization. Using an original dataset on 19th century constitutionalists in the Ottoman Empire, I measure the effect of preference diversity on contenders’ capacity to cooperate for regime change. I show that that preference diversity causes coordination problems and hinders cooperation, whereby the authoritarian government continues to survive. Contenders’ capacity to cooperate increases if certain beliefs emerge as focal points and facilitate coordination. This research contributes to democratization literature by showing that regime contending groups’ capacity to cooperate makes an impact on regime transition independently of governmental maneuvers, foreign support, or institutional obstacles. As regards cooperation, results suggest that beliefs have a significant and independent effect on cooperation even after controlling for instrumental rationality and material interests.

Lunch will be served. Feel free to invite friends and colleagues. Please RSVP here by Friday, March 20.

If you are interested in presenting a work-in-progress at a future MARC meeting, please email Rosemary Clark (rclark@asc.upenn.edu).